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Fusion techniques can be used in biometrics to achieve 
higher accuracy. When biometric systems are in operation 
and the threat level changes, controlling the trade-off 
between detection error rates can reduce the impact of an 
attack. In a fused system, varying a single threshold does 
not allow this to be achieved, but systematic adjustment of a 
set of parameters does. In this paper, fused decisions from 
a multi-part, multi-sample sequential architecture are 
investigated for that purpose in an iris recognition system. 
A specific implementation of the multi-part architecture is 
proposed and the effect of the number of parts and samples 
in the resultant detection error rate is analysed. The 
effectiveness of the proposed architecture is then evaluated 
under two specific cases of obfuscation attack: miosis and 
mydriasis. Results show that robustness to such obfuscation 
attacks is achieved, since lower error rates than in the case 
of the non-fused base system are obtained.  
 
1. Introduction 
Using fusion techniques to achieve higher accuracy in 
the biometric field is now common practice. Within the 
algorithm framework, considerable research has been done 
into fusion of information from multiple sources at 
different levels: data, feature, score and decision levels [1]. 
Matcher decisions are the smallest and most unambiguous 
piece of information for fusion. For this reason, decision 
level fusion allows single modality based systems to 
combine even if these systems have been developed 
independently, possibly by different companies, and 
internal workings are not made public. This is a very 
common situation in the case of many commercial 
off-the-shelf (COTS) biometric matchers. There is, 
however, some trade-off through loss of information in the 
threshold operation that makes each individual decision, 
but this is not critical if individual systems working with 
single modalities have been designed to make near-optimal 
use of all information available to them. These 
considerations are also valid in the case of multiple 
classifiers designed using the same modality but different 
information sources. There are several approaches that can 
be considered at the decision level [1, 2]. Existing 
approaches include simple rules as the AND/OR rules, 
majority voting and weighted majority voting. The 
performance of these approaches is compared in [3, 4] for 
different multibiometric systems. Other approaches include 
Bayesian fusion rules [5] or the Behaviour Knowledge 
Spaced (BSK) method [6]. The Dempster-Shafer theory of 
evidence was used by Kuncheva in [7], and compared with 
more than ten different classifier fusion techniques.  
 
Recent investigations by Nallagatla and Chandran [8, 9] 
using text-dependent speech have shown that in a 
sequential decision fusion architecture with multiple 
instances and multiple samples, it is possible to control the 
trade-off between false accept and false reject errors using 
the number of instances and samples considered in the 
architecture. Such control is not guaranteed by other 
methods of classifier combination such as adaptive 
boosting [10], for example, where the objective is to obtain 
optimal performance (least total error). In this case, 
thresholds at each classifier stage are set accordingly and 
once the chain of classifiers is selected there are no 
parameters that control the trade-off between errors. 
Controlled trade-off is especially desirable when biometric 
systems are in operation and the threat level changes. In 
general, under normal operating conditions false 
acceptances are kept very low and false rejections may be 
reasonably higher. Any false rejections are usually 
processed with less reliable and less secure means as 
fallback mechanisms. However, a person on a watch list 
can take advantage of this and use a sample presentation 
attack such as alteration of his iris or face to prevent being 
matched to the watch list. In these situations it is desirable 
to lower false rejections. Additional biometric information 
may then be called into operation when the threat level (or 
probability of such attacks) is considered high. For such 
scenarios, it is necessary to understand how biometric 
fusion can be used to achieve desired objectives. 
 
The adaptation and application of a multi-instance, 
multi-sample sequential decision fusion architecture to iris 
recognition in the context of preventing sample 
presentation attacks is a research problem that has not been 
addressed yet. This paper is aimed at investigating the 
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viability of such an approach in detail. How sample 
presentation attacks, and more specifically, obfuscation 
attacks, affect iris recognition systems is explained in 
section 2. Section 3 provides details of the fusion 
architecture. Section 4 describes the methodology used to 
evaluate the fused system performance and the results. 
Finally, a brief conclusion with suggestions for potential 
future work is included in section 5. 
2. Sample presentation attacks 
Any biometric system, regardless of the trait, is basically 
composed of four different subsystems: data acquisition, 
pre-processing, feature extraction and comparison. Each 
subsystem may have different points of attack, and for each 
point of attack, there may be one or more potential exploits. 
Some of the early work by Ratha et al. [11] identified eight 
possible points of attack. Further work by Jain et al. [12] 
and Wayman [13] sought to refine this approach. Bartlow 
and Cukic [14] and Common Criteria [15] extended this 
research by adding administrative components.  
 
Among all potential attacks, this paper focuses on attacks 
at the user interface level or sample presentation attacks, 
which are defined as any attempt to break into a system by 
presenting a biometric sample. These attacks can be 
categorized into three main groups [16]: impersonation (an 
impostor attempts to intrude the system by posing himself 
as another authorized user), obfuscation or disguise 
(attacker deliberately changes his/her biometric 
characteristic to avoid being recognized) and spoofing (a 
counterfeit biometric trait that is not obtained from a live 
claimant is used to achieve positive recognition). The main 
problem for an impostor to successfully perform 
impersonation or spoofing attacks is that it is necessary to 
have a good copy or some prior knowledge of the biometric 
trait corresponding to the identity to be attacked. The 
difficulty of this depends strongly on the trait. Obfuscation 
attacks, on the contrary, can be easily carried out regardless 
of the trait and no previous knowledge is generally 
required. Apart from that, these attacks can be used to 
illegitimately gain access to a system by circumventing the 
main and most secure subsystem and taking advantage of 
less secure fallback mechanisms if they exist. In such case 
they can be considered as dangerous as impersonation or 
spoofing. According to this, the necessity of minimizing the 
impact of obfuscation attacks is clear and so, we will focus 
in these attacks in this paper. Threats associated with 
obfuscation attacks in iris recognition can be grouped into 
three categories: 
A. Intentional presentation of noisy or poor-quality samples 
A noisy, poor-quality or null iris sample that may not 
match the attacker template can be intentionally presented 
to the system to avoid recognition. Blinking, deviating the 
gaze and using glasses are typical ways to achieve this. 
B. Artificially provoked iris alterations 
Given the anatomic characteristics of the iris, altering it in 
any way is extremely difficult. However, two types of iris 
alterations can be easily provoked: mydriasis and miosis. 
Mydriasis is an excessive dilation of the pupil arising from 
disease, trauma or the use of drugs or alcohol. It can also be 
artificially provoked by using a mydriatic agent in the form 
of eyedrops. Non-elastic deformations of the iris occur as 
the pupil dilates. Miosis, on the other hand, is an excessive 
constriction of the pupil which can also be artificially 
provoked by using a miotic agent. The effect of pupil 
dilation on iris recognition has been addressed before [17]; 
however, this research did not extend to extreme cases of 
pupil dilation or constriction or changes in the threat level. 
C. Occlusion of the iris 
The iris can be easily occluded by using cosmetic lenses, 
which are contact lenses with a pattern printed or painted on 
them. Where they are opaque, they totally occlude the iris, 
making the corresponding iris texture unavailable.  
 
It is a fact that the above-mentioned attacks degrade iris 
recognition performance [18], regardless of its high 
accuracy. In order to demonstrate this, an iris recognition 
algorithm inspired by Daugman’s works [19] has been used 
here. The segmentation process combines the black hole 
search method [20] and a simplified version of Daugman’s 
integro-differential operator. Feature extraction is based on 
Gabor filters and Hamming distance is used for 
classification (see subsection 4.1). Images from the three 
previous categories have been used to calculate the 
detection error rates corresponding to the system threshold 
under normal operating conditions (see Figure 1). Results 






A multi-part, multi-sample architecture for robust iris 
recognition is proposed in this research work. To 
demonstrate that such architecture can improve the 
performance of an iris recognition system under the threat 
Figure 1: Detection error rates for different obfuscation attacks




of an obfuscation attack, artificially provoked iris 
alterations (mydriasis and miosis) are considered. The 
objective in this work is to deal with and minimize the 
impact of samples affected by severe mydriasis and miosis, 
instead of just detecting and discarding the sample, as 
commonly done in currently deployed systems. For the two 
attacks chosen, DET curves have been added to Figure 1 to 
illustrate the fact that reducing the impact of the attack is 
not possible by just varying a single threshold of the base 
system because it results in a trade-off. 
3. Multi-biometric decision fusion techniques 
3.1. Multi-part fusion scheme 
  For iris recognition, using both irises as different 
instances in a multi-classifier or multi-instance fusion 
scheme is the most common approach. However, this 
option does not seem to be useful in the case of obfuscation 
attacks, since if the impostor deliberately changes his/her 
iris to avoid being recognized, such modification can most 
probably be done for both irises. Instead, using different 
parts of the same iris image as the different instances seems 
to be a reasonable approach for various reasons. First of all, 
since the number of instances is one of the key factors to 
control detection errors, the possibility of considering more 
than just two inputs (left and right irises) makes the system 
more versatile and errors easier to control. Secondly, both 
under normal and threatening conditions, noise sources as 
eyelids or bright spots can be avoided. In general, iris 
recognition using parts has been considered in the literature 
for different purposes, such as dealing with noise [21], 
cancellable iris biometrics [22] or efficiency improvement 
[23]. Here, the part based approach is mainly used to make 
the base architecture robust to obfuscation attacks, although 
some of the above-mentioned advantages are also 
applicable. 
 
There are many schemes for dividing an iris into parts. 
Concentric rings of equal width have been chosen in this 
paper. Iris templates are built for each ring and classifiers 
for the different rings form the stages of the sequential 
decision fusion architecture. Only if the decisions from all 
stages are accept, the claim is accepted. This is equivalent 
to applying an AND decision fusion rule. This fusion 
method effectively reduces the false acceptances; however, 
it can increase the number of false rejections. In the case of 
a multi-part scheme with ‘n’ stages, the False Acceptance 
Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR) of the fused 
system in terms of false acceptance rate ‘α’ and false 
rejection rate ‘ρ’ for each statistically independent 
classifier can be calculated as follows [8]:  
  
ߙ௙௨௦௘ௗ ൌ ߙ௡ 
 
(1) 
ߩ௙௨௦௘ௗ ൌ ߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߩሻߩ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߩሻଶߩ ൅ ڮ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߩሻ௡ିଵߩ (2) 
Equation (2) can be reduced to ρ୤୳ୱୣୢ ൎ nρ  when 
ρ << 1, but such simplification is not appropriate when 
dealing with obfuscation attacks, since false rejections are 
significantly increased with respect to normal operating 
conditions. 
3.2. Multi-sample fusion scheme 
In order to reduce false rejections, multiple iris samples 
can be used. These samples are divided into rings in the 
same manner. At any given stage (part classifier), there are 
multiple samples that can be presented if the decision is 
reject. The number of samples is limited to a maximum 
allowable. If this number is exceeded, the claim is rejected. 
Acceptance of a claim at any given stage is equivalent to an 
OR decision fusion rule among samples. This fusion 
method helps in reducing false rejections, but it can 
increase false acceptances since the impostor is given 
additional chances for verification. This fact becomes clear 
when considering equations (3) and (4) [8], which allow the 
calculation of the FAR and FRR of a multi-sample fusion 
scheme with ‘m’ maximum repeated attempts in terms of 
the probabilities of false acceptance and false rejection for 
each independent attempt (α and ρ).  
 
ߙ௙௨௦௘ௗ ൌ ݉ߙ 
 
(3) 
ߩ௙௨௦௘ௗ ൌ ߩ௠ (4) 
3.3. Multi-part and multi-sample schemes 
integration 
The resulting architecture after combining the multi-part 
and multi-sample schemes can be seen in Figure 2. It 
includes ‘n’ classifiers arranged sequentially and allows up 
to ‘m’ samples presentation (dashed line) in case any of the 
user’s claims is not accepted by the system (d=0).  
 
 
 Figure 2: Multi-part, multi-sample decision fusion scheme 
From equations (1)-(4), FAR and FRR of the fused 
system in terms of false acceptance and false rejection for 
each independent attempt (α and 
according to (5)-(6). By choosing appro
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4. Experimental validation 
4.1. Iris recognition base algorithm
The implemented iris recognition 
based on Daugman’s approach [19], a
some modifications. In the pre-process
hole search method [20] is first used 
(course search). A simplified versi
integro-differential operator is then us
define the contours. In order to detect a
eliminate the non-biometric informatio
combination of Canny´s edge detection
Deriche et al. algorithm [25] is used. Re
extraction stage, convolution with 2-
filters is considered to extract the 
normalized iris image. Filtering is pe
(normalized image is divided into 12 ri
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barrel-shifting to prevent iris rotation. 
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177 images captured under normal c
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4.2. Database 
In the case of artificially provoked
miotic/mydriatic agent in the form of ey
to participants to create the dataset, con
654 images (see Table 1) acquired 
640x468. Although the initial datase
around 30% of the images were dis
segmentation errors. The increase in seg
an important effect of miosis and m
degrades recognition performance, bu
avoided here because the robustness of
iris texture changes as a result of the
evaluated, distinct from segmentation 
used for the data collection is the IG-
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4.3. Train and test strategy
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ሺ1 െ ߩሻ௡ିଵߩ  from 1 to ‘n’. Since multiplicative changes 
are faster than additive ones, the reduction in the FAR is 
faster than the increase in the FRR, especially if the number 
of parts used is small. This behaviour can be clearly 
observed in Figure 4 a.1-a.2. Results also show that by 
adding enough stages to the architecture FAR can be made 
low at the cost of a higher FRR. This trend is not useful 
with obfuscation attacks. 
B. Multi-sample fusion results. 
In the case of multi-sample, a maximum of three sample 
presentations are allowed to verify the user (m = 3). 
Samples are chosen randomly from the test data set. To be 
consistent with the multi-instance experiment, the only 
classifier existing in this scheme (n = 1) corresponds to the 
inner ring of the iris (the nearest to the pupil). Results for an 
increasing number ‘m’ of samples (m = 1, 2 and 3) are 
shown in Figure 4 b.1-b.2. As it can be observed, the more 
samples considered the lower value of the FRR, but since 
the FAR increases, it is clear that for the total error to 
decrease, a combination of multiple parts and samples is 
needed. Consistent with equation (4), the FRR is decreasing 
multiplicatively with the number ‘m’ of attempts. However, 
the FAR does not increase exactly in an additive way, as 
stated in equation (3). It may be noted that equations (3)-(4) 
assume statistical independence, which is usually an 
unrealistic assumption. Methods to select a specific subset 
of classifiers to achieve optimal performance considering 
statistical dependence will be explored as future work.   
C. Multi-part, multi-sample fusion results. 
Results obtained when integrating the multi-part and 
multi-sample schemes are shown in Figure 4 c.1-c.2. For 
clarity purposes, just the cases in which halves and thirds of 
the iris (n = 2, 3) are used as parts are considered. Table 2 
shows the results obtained with the best selection of parts 
and samples among those represented in Figure 4 c.1-c.2. 
Comparing the multi-part, multi-sample results with the 
reference (best error rate achieved from non-fused base 
algorithm with the whole iris), it can be observed that 
robustness against the obfuscation attacks is achieved, with 
lower error rates that are statistically significant. Even more 
promising is the fact that, in some cases, it is not necessary 
to use the whole iris for that. This can be observed for 
example in the case of miosis, when using 2 out of 3 thirds 
of the iris and 3 samples. 
   
(a.1) (b.1) (c.1) 
  
 
(a.2) (b.2) (c.2) 
Figure 4: Detection error rates of (a) multi-part fusion, (b) multi-sample fusion and (c) multi-part and multi-sample fusion for miosis and 






Table 2. Average error rates with standard deviation for best cases 
 Whole iris   
(reference) 
Best selection of 
parts and samples 
Miosis 
FAR 5.189 ± 1.20 
1/3 iris (2,2) 3.643 ± 0.96 
1/3 iris (2,3) 6.398 ± 1.26 
FRR 6.800 ± 7.12 
1/3 iris (2,2) 4.706 ± 6.11 
1/3 iris (2,3) 1.176 ± 3.25 
Mydriasis FAR 1.266 
± 0.42 1/2 iris (2,3) 1.085 ± 0.35 
FRR 2.666 ± 4.2 1/2 iris (2,3) 0.833 ± 2.52 
 
5. Conclusion and future work 
A multi-part, multi-sample sequential decision fusion 
architecture is applied to an iris recognition system and 
demonstrated to provide robustness under obfuscation 
attacks (mydriasis and miosis) by (a) controlled error 
trade-off and (b) lower error rates. Preliminary results show 
that for mydriasis, better results can be achieved without 
using the whole iris when using the second and third rings 
of the iris (out of 3) instead of the first and second rings. 
The reason why this happens is that the non-elastic 
deformations of the iris when the pupil excessively dilates 
degrade most severely the ring nearest to the pupil. Thus, 
ring order can also be considered to improve the results. 
Future work will investigate the effects of ordered parts and 
statistical dependence between classifier decisions.  
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